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Abstract. We present algorithms for checking and enforcing robustness
of concurrent programs against the Total Store Ordering (TSO) memory
model. A program is robust if all its TSO computations correspond to
computations under the Sequential Consistency (SC) semantics.
We provide a complete characterization of non-robustness in terms of
so-called attacks: a restricted form of (harmful) out-of-program-order
executions. Then, we show that detecting attacks can be parallelized,
and can be solved using state reachability queries under SC semantics
in a suitably instrumented program obtained by a linear size source-to-
source translation. Importantly, the construction is valid for an arbitrary
number of addresses and an arbitrary number of parallel threads, and it
is independent from the data domain and from the size of store buffers
in the TSO semantics. In particular, when the data domain is finite and
the number of addresses is fixed, we obtain decidability and complexity
results for robustness, even for an arbitrary number of threads.
As a second contribution, we provide an algorithm for computing an op-
timal set of fences that enforce robustness. We consider two criteria of
optimality: minimization of program size and maximization of its perfor-
mance. The algorithms we define are implemented, and we successfully
applied them to analyzing and correcting several concurrent algorithms.
1 Introduction
Sequential consistency (SC) [21] is a natural shared-memory model where the
actions of different threads are interleaved while the program order between
actions of each thread is preserved. However, for performance reasons, modern
multiprocessors implement weaker memory models relaxing program order. For
instance, the common store-to-load relaxation, which allows loads to overtake
stores, reflects the use of store buffers. It is actually the main feature of the TSO
(Total Store Ordering) model adopted, e.g., in x86 machines [27].
Nonetheless, most programmers usually assume that memory accesses are
performed according to SC where all shared-memory accesses are instanta-
neous and atomic. This assumption is actually safe for data-race-free programs
[3], but in many situations data-race-freedom does not apply. This is, for in-
stance, the case of programs implementing synchronization operations, concur-
rency libraries, and other performance-critical system services employing lock-
free synchronization. In most cases, programmers design programs that are ro-
bust against relaxations, i.e., for which relaxations do not introduce behaviors
that are not allowed under SC. Memory fences must be included appropriately
in programs in order to prevent non-SC behaviors. Getting such programs right
is a notoriously difficult and error-prone task. Therefore, important issues in this
context are (1) checking robustness of a program against relaxations of a mem-
ory model, and (2) identifying a set of program locations where it is necessary
to insert fences to ensure robustness.
In this paper we address these two issues in the case of TSO. We consider a
general setting without fixed bounds on the shared memory size, nor on the size of
the store buffers in the TSO semantics, nor on the number of threads. This allows
us to reason about robustness of general algorithms without assuming any fixed
values for these parameters that depend on the actual machine’s implementation.
Moreover, we tackle these issues for general programs, independently from the
domain of data they manipulate.
Robustness against memory models has been addressed first by Burckhardt
and Musuvathi in [9] (actually, for TSO only), and subsequently by Burnim et
al. in [10]. Alglave and Maranget developed a general framework for reasoning
about robustness against memory models in [4,5] (where the term stability is
used instead of robustness). Roughly, these works are based on characterizing
robustness in terms of acyclicity of a suitable happens-before relation. In that,
they follow the spirit of Shasha and Snir [28] who introduced a notion of trace
that captures the control and data dependencies between events of an SC compu-
tation, and established that computations that are not SC have a happens-before
relation that contains a cycle. We adopt here the same notion of robustness, i.e.,
a program is (trace-)robust if each of its TSO computations has the same trace
as some of its SC computations.
From an algorithmic point of view, the existing works mentioned above do
not provide decision procedures for robustness. [9,10] provide testing procedures
based on enumerating TSO runs and checking that they do not produce happens-
before cycles. Clearly, while these procedures can establish non-robustness, they
can never prove a program robust. On the other hand, [5] provides a sound
over-approximate static analysis that allows to prove robustness, but may also
inaccurately conclude to non-robustness and insert fences unnecessarily. We are
interested here in developing an approach that allows for precise checking of
trace-robustness, and for optimal fence insertion (in a sense defined later).
In our previous work [8], trace-robustness against TSO has been proved to be
decidable and PSpace-complete, even for unbounded store buffers, in the case
of a fixed number of threads and assuming a fixed number of shared variables,
ranging over a finite data domain. The method that shows this decidability
and complexity result does not provide a practical algorithm: it is based on a
non-deterministic, bounded enumeration of computations. Moreover, it does not
carry over to the general setting we consider here. Therefore, in this paper we
propose a novel approach to checking robustness that is fundamentally different
from [8]. We provide a general, source-to-source reduction of the trace-robustness
problem against TSO to the state reachability problem under SC semantics.
In other words, we show that trace-robustness is not more expensive than SC
state reachability, which is the unavoidable problem to be solved by any precise
decision algorithm for concurrent programs. This is the key contribution of the
paper from which we derive other results, such as decidability results in particular
cases, as well as an algorithm for efficient fence insertion.
To establish our reduction, we first provide a complete characterization of
non-robustness in terms of so-called feasible attacks. An attack is a pair of load
and store instructions of a thread, called the attacker, whose reordering can lead
to a non-SC computation. In that case we say the attack is feasible, because
it has a (TSO) witness computation. The special form of witness computations
then allows us to detect them by tracking SC computations of an instrumented
program. Given a potential attack, we show how to check its feasibility by solving
an SC state reachability query in a linear-size instrumented program. The fact
that only SC semantics (of the instrumented program) needs to be considered
for detecting non-SC behaviors (of the original program) is important: it relieves
us from examining TSO computations, which obliges to encode (somehow) the
contents of store buffers (as in, e.g., [9,10]). Interestingly, the detection of feasible
attacks can be parallelized, which speeds up the decision procedure. Overall,
we provide a general reduction of the TSO robustness problem to a quadratic
number (in the size of the program) of state reachability queries under the SC
semantics in linear-size instrumented programs of the same type as the original
one. Our construction is source-to-source and is valid for (1) an arbitrary number
of memory addresses/variables, (2) an arbitrary data domain, (3) an arbitrary
number of threads, and (4) unbounded store buffers.
With this reduction, we can harness all available techniques and tools for
solving reachability queries (either exactly, or approximately) in various classes
of concurrent programs, regardless of decidability and complexity issues. It also
yields decision algorithms for significant classes of programs. Assume we have a
finite number of memory addresses, and the data domain is finite. Then, for a
fixed number of threads, a direct consequence of our reduction is that the robust-
ness problem is decidable and in PSpace since it is polynomially reducible to
state reachability in finite-state concurrent programs [18]. Therefore, we obtain
in this case a simple robustness checking algorithm which matches the com-
plexity upper bound proved in [8]. Our construction also provides an effective
decision algorithm for the up to now open case where the number of threads is
arbitrarily large. Indeed, state reachability queries in this case can be solved in
vector addition systems with states (VASS), or equivalently as coverability in
Petri nets, which is known to be decidable [26] and EXPSpace-hard [23]. In
both cases (fixed or arbitrary number of threads) the decision algorithms do not
assume bounded store buffers.
As last contribution, we address the issue of enforcing robustness by fence
insertion. Obviously, inserting a fence after each store ensures robustness, but
it also ruins all performance benefits that a relaxed memory model brings. A
natural requirement on the set of fences is irreducibility, i.e., minimality wrt. set
inclusion. Since there may be several irreducible sets enforcing robustness, it is
natural to ask for a set that optimizes some notion of cost. We assume that we
have a cost function that defines the cost of inserting a fence at each program
location. For instance, by assuming cost 1 for all locations, we optimize the size
of the fence set. Other cost functions reflect the performance of the resulting
program. We propose an algorithm which, given a cost function, computes an
optimal set of fences. The algorithm is based on 0/1-integer linear programming
and exploits the notion of attacks to guide the selection of fences.
We implemented the algorithms (using SPIN as a back-end reachability
checker), and applied them successfully to several examples, including mutual
exclusion protocols and concurrent data structures. The experiments we have
carried out show that our approach is quite effective: (1) Many of the attacks
to be examined can be discarded by simple syntactic checks (e.g., the presence
of a fence between the store and load instructions), and those that require
solving reachability queries are handled in few seconds, (2) the fence insertion
procedure finds efficiently optimal sets of fences, in particular, it can handle
the version of the Non-Blocking Write protocol [17] described in [24] (where
the write is guarded by a Linux x86 spinlock) for which Owens’ method based
on so-called triangular data races (see related work below) inserts unnecessary
fences.
Related work: There are only few results on decidability and complexity of
relaxed memory models. Reachability under TSO has been shown to be decid-
able but non-primitive recursive [7] in the case of a finite number of threads and
a finite data domain. In the same case, trace-robustness has been shown to be
PSpace-complete in [8] using a combinatorial approach. The method we adopt
in this paper is conceptually and technically different from the one we took in
[8]. While we reuse from [8] the fact that it is possible to reason on TSO compu-
tations where only one thread has reordered its actions, we develop here a new
approach where the main technical contributions reside in the characterization
of non-robustness in terms of existence of feasible attacks and in the instrumen-
tation we provide to reduce trace-robustness to SC state reachability. Besides
getting decidability and complexity results, this reduction allows to leverage all
the existing verification methods and tools for checking (SC) state reachabil-
ity in various classes of programs to tackle the issue of checking and enforcing
robustness against TSO.
Alur et al. have shown that checking sequential consistency of a concurrent
implementation wrt. a specification is undecidable in general [6]. This result
does not contradict our findings: we consider here the special case where the
implementation is the TSO semantics and the specification is the SC semantics
of a program. In [14], the problem of deciding whether a given computation is SC
feasible has been proved NP-complete. Robustness is concerned with all TSO
computations, instead.
As mentioned above, the problem of checking and enforcing trace-robustness
against weak memory models has been addressed in [9,10,5], but none of these
works provide (sound and complete) decision procedures. Owens proposes in [24]
a notion of robustness that is stronger than trace-robustness, based on detecting
triangular data races. This allows for sound trace-robustness checking but, as
Owens shows in his paper, in some cases leads to unnecessary fences which can
be harmful for performance. Moreover, the notion of triangular data races defined
in [24] comes without an algorithm for checking it1. Complexity considerations
(using the techniques in [8]) show that detecting triangular data races requires
solving state reachability queries under SC. Therefore, as we show here, checking
trace-robustness is not more expensive than detecting triangular data races.
State-based robustness (which preserves the reachable states) is a weaker
robustness criterion, but does not preserve path properties in contrast to trace-
robustness, and is of significantly higher complexity (non-primitive recursive as
it can be deduced from [7], instead of PSpace). It has been addressed in a
precise manner in [2] where a symbolic decision procedure together with a fence
insertion algorithm are provided. The same issue is addressed in [19,20] using
over-approximate reachability analysis based on abstractions of the store buffers.
Finally, let us mention work that considers the dual approach: starting from a
robust program, remove unnecessary fences [29]. This work is aimed at compiler
optimisations and does not provide a decision procedure for robustness. It can
also not find an optimal set of fences the enforce trace-robustness.
2 Parallel Programs
Syntax We consider parallel programs with shared memory as defined by the
grammar in Figure 1. Programs have a name and consist of a finite number of
threads. Each thread has an identifier and a list of local registers it operates on.
The thread’s source code is given as a finite sequence of labelled instructions.
More than one instruction can be marked by the same label; this allows us
to mimic expressive constructs like conditional branching and iteration with a
lightweight syntax. The instruction set includes loads from memory to a local
register, stores to memory, memory fences to control TSO store buffers, local
computations, and assertions. Figure 2 provides a sample program.
We assume a program comes with two sets: a data domain DOM and a
function domain FUN. The data domain should contain value zero: 0 ∈ DOM.
Moreover, we assume that all values from DOM can be used as addresses. Each
memory location accessed by loads and stores is identified by such an address,
and memory locations identified by different addresses do not overlap. The set
FUN contains functions that are defined on the data domain and can be used in
the program. Note that we do not make any finiteness assumptions.
TSO Semantics Fix a program P with threads THRD := {t1, . . . , tn}. Let each
thread ti have the initial label l0,i and declare registers ri. We define the set of
variables as the union of addresses and registers: VAR := DOM ∪ ∪i∈[1,n]ri. We
denote the set of all instruction labels that occur in threads by LAB.
The TSO semantics is operational, in terms of states and labelled transitions
between them. On the x86 TSO architecture, each processor effectively has a
local FIFO buffer that keeps stores for later execution [25,27,9,10]. Therefore,
1 Citation from [24]: “... formal reasoning directly on traces can be tedious, so a pro-
gram logic or sound static analyzer specialized to proving triangular-race freedom
might make the application of TRF more convenient.”
〈prog〉 ::= program 〈pid〉 〈thrd〉∗
〈thrd〉 ::= thread 〈tid〉
regs 〈reg〉∗
init 〈label〉
begin 〈linst〉∗ end
〈linst〉 ::= 〈label〉: 〈inst〉; goto 〈label〉;
〈inst〉 ::= 〈reg〉 ← mem[〈expr〉]
| mem[〈expr〉] ← 〈expr〉
| mfence
| 〈reg〉 ← 〈expr〉
| assert 〈expr〉
〈expr〉 ::= 〈fun〉(〈reg〉∗)
Fig. 1: Syntax of parallel programs.
program Dekker
thread t1 regs r1 init l0 begin
l0: mem[x] ← 1; goto l1;
l1: r1 ← mem[y]; goto l2;
end
thread t2 regs r2 init l
′
0 begin
l
′
0: mem[y] ← 1; goto l
′
1;
l
′
1: r2 ← mem[x]; goto l
′
2;
end
Fig. 2: Simplified version of Dekker’s
mutex algorithm. Under SC, it is im-
possible that r1 = r2 = 0 when both
threads reach l2 and l
′
2.
a state is a triple s = (pc, val, buf) where program counter pc : THRD → LAB
holds, for each thread, the label of the instruction(s) to be executed next. The
valuation val : VAR→ DOM gives the values of registers and memory locations.
The third component buf : THRD → (DOM × DOM)∗ is the (per thread) buffer
content: a sequence of address-value pairs a← v.
In the initial state s0 := (pc0, val0, buf0) the program counter is set to the
initial labels, pc0(ti) = l0,i for all ti ∈ THRD, registers and addresses hold value
zero, val0(x) = 0 for all x ∈ VAR, and all buffers are empty, buf0(t) := ε for all
t ∈ THRD. Here, ε denotes the empty sequence.
Instructions yield transitions between states that are labelled by actions from
ACT := THRD×({isu, loc} ∪ ({ld, st} × DOM × DOM)). An action consists of the
thread id and the actual arguments of an executed instruction. We use loc to
abstract assignments and asserts that are local to the thread. The issue action isu
indicates that a store was executed on the processor. The store action (t, st, a, v)
gives the moment when the store becomes visible in memory.
The TSO transition relation −→TSO is the smallest relation between TSO
states that is defined by the rules in Table 1. The rules repeat, up to notation and
support for locked instructions, Figure 1 from [25]. The first two rules implement
loads from the buffer and from the memory respectively. By the third rule,
store instructions enqueue write operations to the buffer. The fourth rule non-
deterministically dequeues and executes them on memory. The fifth rule defines
that memory fences can only be executed when the buffer is empty. The last two
rules refer to local assignments and assertions. We omitted locked instructions
to keep things simple. Their introduction is straightforward and does not affect
the results. Indeed, our implementation supports them [1].
The set of TSO computations contains all sequences of actions that lead from
the initial TSO state to a state where all buffers are empty:
CTSO(P) := {τ ∈ ACT
∗ | s0
τ
−→TSO s for some TSO state
s = (pc, val, buf) with buf(t) = ε for all t ∈ THRD}.
〈instr〉 = r ← mem[fa(ra)], a = fa(val(ra)), buf(t)↓(a ← ∗) = β · (a ← v)
(pc, val, buf)
(t, ld, a, v)
−−−−−−→TSO (pc
′, val[r := v], buf)
〈instr〉 = r ← mem[fa(ra)], a = fa(val(ra)), buf(t)↓(a ← ∗) = ε, v = val(a)
(pc, val, buf)
(t, ld, a, v)
−−−−−−→TSO (pc
′, val[r := v], buf)
〈instr〉 = mem[fa(ra)] ← fv(rv), a = fa(val(ra)), v = fv(val(rv))
(pc, val, buf)
(t, isu)
−−−→TSO (pc
′, val, buf[t := buf(t) · (a ← v)])
buf(t) = (a ← v) · β
(pc, val, buf)
(t, st, a, v)
−−−−−−→TSO (pc, val[a := v], buf[t := β])
〈instr〉 = mfence, buf(t) = ε
(pc, val, buf)
(t, loc)
−−−→TSO (pc
′, val, buf)
〈instr〉 = r ← f(r)
(pc, val, buf)
(t, loc)
−−−→TSO (pc
′, val[r := f(val(r))], buf)
〈instr〉 = assert f(r), f(val(r)) 6= 0
(pc, val, buf)
(t, loc)
−−−→TSO (pc
′, val, buf)
Table 1: TSO transition rules, assuming pc(t) = l, an instruction 〈instr〉 at label
l with destination l′, and pc′ := pc[t := l′]. We use ↓ to denote projection and ∗
for any value, i.e., buf(t)↓(a← ∗) is a list of address-value pairs in the buffer of
thread t having the address a.
The requirement of empty buffers is not important for our results but rather
a modelling choice. Figure 3 presents a TSO computation of Dekker’s program
where the store of the first thread is delayed past the load.
τ =(t1, isu)(t1, ld, y, 0)(t2, isu)(t2, st, y, 1) (t2, ld, x, 0) (t1, st, x, 1)
Fig. 3: A TSO computation of Dekker’s algorithm. Actions drawn in red belong
to the first thread, actions in blue belong to the second thread. The arc connects
the issue action with the corresponding delayed store action of the first thread.
SC Semantics Under SC [21], stores are not buffered and hence states are pairs
(pc, val). The rules for SC transitions are appropriately simplified TSO rules. To
avoid case distinctions between TSO and SC in the definition of traces, a store
instruction generates two actions: an issue followed by the store. Memory fences
have no effect under SC. We denote the set of all SC computations of P by
CSC(P) := {σ ∈ ACT
∗ | s0
σ
−→SC s for some SC state s}.
3 TSO Robustness
Robustness ensures that the behaviour of a program does not change when it
is run on TSO hardware as compared to SC. We study trace-based robustness
as in [28,9,10,5,8]. Traces capture the essence of a computation: the control and
data dependencies among actions. More formally, consider some computation
α ∈ CSC(P) ∪ CTSO(P). The trace Tr(α) is a graph where the nodes are labelled
by the actions in α (stores and issue yield one node). The arcs are defined by the
following relations. We have a per thread t ∈ THRD total order →tpo that gives
the order in which the actions of t where issued. Similarly, we have a per address
a ∈ DOM total order →ast that gives the ordering of all stores to a. We call the
unions→po := ∪t∈THRD →
t
po and→st := ∪a∈DOM →
a
st the program order and the
store order of the trace. Finally, there is a source relation →src that determines
the store from which a load receives its value. By Trmm(P) := Tr(Cmm(P)) with
mm ∈ {SC,TSO} we denote the set of all SC/TSO traces of program P . The
TSO robustness problem checks whether the sets coincide.
Given: A parallel program P .
Problem: Does TrTSO(P) = TrSC(P) hold?
Since inclusion TrSC(P) ⊆ TrTSO(P) always holds, we only have to check the
reverse inclusion. We call a computation τ ∈ CTSO(P) violating if its trace is
not among the SC traces of the program, i.e., Tr(τ) /∈ TrSC(P). Violating TSO-
computations employ cyclic accesses to addresses that SC is unable to serialize
[28]. The cyclic accesses are made visible using a conflict relation from loads
to stores. Intuitively, ld →cf st means that st overwrites a value that ld reads.
The union of all four relations is commonly called happens-before relation of the
trace, →hb := →po ∪ →st ∪ →src ∪ →cf .
Lemma 1 ([28]). Consider TSO trace Tr(τ) ∈ TrTSO(P). Then Tr(τ) ∈ TrSC(P)
iff →hb is acyclic.
Consider the computation in Figure 3. The load from thread t1 conflicts with
the store from t2 because the load reads the initial value of y while the store
overwrites it. The situation with the load from t2 and the store from t1 is sym-
metric. Together with the program order, the conflict relations produce a cycle:
(t1, st, x, 1)
(t1, ld, y, 0) (t2, st, y, 1)
(t2, ld, x, 0)
po po
cf
cf
Indeed, there is no SC computation with this trace, as predicted by Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 does not provide a method for finding cyclic traces. We have re-
cently shown that TSO robustness is decidable, in fact, PSpace-complete [8].
The algorithm underlying this result, however, is based on enumeration and not
meant to be implemented. The main contribution of the present work is a novel
and practical approach to checking robustness.
τ = isustA ldA stAτ1 τ2 τ3 τ4
Fig. 4: TSO witness for the attack (tA, stinst, ldinst). It satisfies the following
constraints. (W1) Only the attacker delays stores. (W2) Store stA is an instance
of stinst. It is the first store of the attacker that is delayed. Load ldA is an instance
of ldinst. It is the last action of the attacker that is overstepped by stA. So τ2
contains loads, assignments, asserts, and issues, but no fences and stores of the
attacker. It may contain arbitrary helper actions. (W3) We require ldA →
+
hb act
for every action act in ldA · τ3 · stA. An issue + store of a helper is counted as one
action act. (W4) Sequence τ4 only consists of stores of the attacker that were
issued before ldA and that have been delayed. (W5) All these stores st satisfy
addr (st) 6= addr (ldA), i.e., ldA has not read its value early.
The only concept we keep from our earlier work are minimal violations. A
minimal violation is a violating computation that uses a minimal total number
of delays. Interestingly, for minimal violations the following holds.
Lemma 2 (Locality [8], Appendix B). In a minimal violation, only a single
thread delays stores.
Consider the computation in Figure 3. It relies on a single delay in thread t1 and,
indeed, is a minimal violation. As predicted by the lemma, the second thread
writes to its buffer and immediately flushes it.
4 Attacks on TSO Robustness
Our approach to checking TSO robustness combines two insights. We first
rephrase robustness in terms of a simpler problem: the absence of feasible attacks.
We then devise an algorithm that checks attacks for feasibility. Interestingly, SC
reachability techniques are sufficient for this purpose. Together, this yields a
sound and complete reduction of TSO robustness to SC reachability.
The notion of attacks is inspired by the shape of minimal violations. We show
that if a program is not robust, then there are violations of the form shown in
Figure 4: one thread, the attacker, delays a store action stA past a later load
action ldA in order to break robustness. The remaining threads become helpers
and provide a happens-before path from ldA to stA. This yields a happens-before
cycle and shows non-robustness.
Thread, store instruction stinst of stA, and load instruction ldinst of ldA are
syntactic objects. The idea of our approach is to fix these three parameters,
the attack, prior to the analysis. The algorithm then tries to find a witness
computation that proves the attack feasible.
Definition 1. An attack A = (tA, stinst, ldinst) consists of a thread tA ∈ THRD
called attacker, a store instruction stinst and a load instruction ldinst. A TSO
witness for A is a computation of the form in Figure 4, i.e., it satisfies (W1)
to (W5). If a TSO witness exists, the attack is called feasible.
In Dekker’s algorithm, there is an attack A = (tA, stinst, ldinst) with tA = t1,
stinst the store at l0, and ldinst the load at l1. A TSO witness of this attack is
the computation τ from Figure 3. With reference to Figure 4 we have τ1 = ε,
isustA = (t1, isu), τ2 = ε, ldA = (t1, ld, y, 0), τ3 = (t2, isu) · (t2, st, y, 1) · (t2, ld, x, 0),
stA = (t1, st, x, 1), τ4 = ε. The program also contains a symmetric attack A
′ with
t2 as the attacker.
Although TSO witnesses are quite restrictive computations, robustness can
be reduced to verifying that no attack has a TSO witness.
Theorem 1 (Complete Characterization of Robustness with Attacks).
Program P is robust iff no attack is feasible, i.e., no attack admits a TSO witness.
Proof. The existence of a TSO witness implies non-robustness of the program.
Indeed, a TSO witness comes with a happens-before cycle stA →
+
po ldA →
+
hb stA.
We argue that also the reverse holds: if a program is not robust, there is a feasible
attack. Assume P is not robust. We construct a TSO witness computation.
Among the violating computations, we select τ ∈ CTSO(P) where the number of
delays is minimal. The computation need not be unique. By Lemma 2, in τ only
one thread tA uses its buffer and (W1) holds. We elaborate on the shape of τ .
Initially, the attacker executes under SC so that stores immediately follow
their issues. This computation is embedded into τ1 in Figure 4. Eventually, the
attacker starts delaying stores. Let stA be the first store that is delayed. It gets
reordered past several loads, the last of which being ldA. This shows (W2).
The helper actions in τ3 are depicted in blue in Figure 4. To see that we can
assume (W3), first note that ldA →
+
hb stA holds. If there was no such path, stA
could be placed before ldA without changing the trace. This would save a delay,
in contradiction to minimality of τ . Assume τ3 = τ
′
3 ·act ·τ
′′
3 where act is the first
action so that ldA 6→
+
hb act. Then act is independent from all actions in ldA · τ
′
3.
We find a computation with the same trace where act is placed before ldA.
With cycle stA →
+
po ldA →
+
hb stA, computation τ4 only needs to contain the
stores of the attacker that have been delayed past ldA. Since these stores are
non-blocking, the helpers can stop with the last action in τ3. We can moreover
assume ldA to be the program order last action of the attacker. (W4) holds.
We now argue that ldA has not read its value early from any of the delayed
stores, (W5). Towards a contradiction, assume ldA obtained its value from st in
τ4 = τ41 · st · τ42. There is a computation τ
′ where we avoid the early read: it
replaces τ4 by τ41 · st · ldA · τ42. The traces of τ and τ
′ coincide, but τ ′ saves the
delay of st past ldA. A contradiction to minimality.
It is readily checked that τ is a TSO witness for the attack (tA, stinst, ldinst)
where stinst and ldinst are the instructions that stA and ldA are derived from. ⊓⊔
Since the number of attacks is only quadratic in the size of the program, we
can just enumerate them and check whether one admits a TSO witness. To
check whether a witness exists, we employ the instrumentation described in the
following section.
5 Instrumentation
Consider program P with attack A = (tA, stinst, ldinst). TSO witnesses for A only
make limited use of buffers, to an extent that allows us to characterize them
by SC computations in a program PA that is instrumented for attack A. By
instrumentation we mean that PA replaces every thread by a modified version.
Capturing TSO witnesses with a program that runs under SC is difficult for
two reasons. First, TSO has unbounded store buffers which can delay stores
arbitrarily long. Second, the happens-before dependence that the helpers create
may involve an arbitrary number of actions. Our instrumentation copes with
both problems using the following tricks.
To handle store buffering, we instrument the attacker thread (Section 5.1).
Essentially, we emulate store buffering under SC using auxiliary addresses. To
explain the idea, consider the TSO witness in Figure 4. When the instrumented
attacker executes the delayed stores stA · τ4 under SC, they occur right behind
their issue actions. To mimic store buffering, these stores now access auxiliary
addresses that the other threads do not load. As a result, the stores remain
invisible to the helpers. This is as intended: the delayed stores stA ·τ4 in Figure 4
are also never accessed by helper threads. But how many auxiliary addresses do
we need to faithfully simulate buffers? It is sufficient to have a single auxiliary
address per address in the program. The reason is that a load always reads the
most recent store to its address that is held in the buffer.
To build up a happens-before path from ldA to stA, we instrument the helper
threads (Section 5.2). The question is how to decide whether a new action act is in
happens-before relation with an earlier action act′ so that ldA →
∗
hb act
′ →∗hb act.
What is the information we need about the earlier actions in order to append act?
It is sufficient to know two facts. Has the thread already contributed an action
act′? This information ensures act′ →∗po act, and can be kept in the control flow
of the thread. Moreover, we keep track of whether the path contains a load or
store access to the address addr (act). If there was a load access act′ = ld, we
can add a store act = st and get ld →∗hb st. If there was a store, we are free to
add a load or a store. Hence, we need one auxiliary address per address in the
program for this access information: no access, load access, store access.
Consider the TSO witness for Dekker given in Figure 3. Instead of buffering
(t1, st, x, 1), the instrumentation immediately executes the store after its issue
action. But instead of address x, the action accesses the auxiliary address (x, d)
that the other threads do not load. To indicate that this store is invisible to the
helper threads, we depict it in gray. So, the SC computation of the instrumented
program roughly looks like this:
(t1, isu) · (t1, st, (x, d), 1) · (t1, ld, y, 0)
(1)
· (t2, isu)(t2, st, y, 1)
(2)
· (t2, ld, x, 0).
At moment (1), we know that there has been a load access to address y. At
moment (2), address y has even seen a store. At the end of the computation,
address y has seen a store and address x has seen a load.
The store of t2 can be appended since it is in happens-before relation with the
attacker’s load. The following load can be added as t2 has contributed the pre-
vious store. The search terminates here since the helper’s load accesses address
x that was used by the store from the attack.
5.1 Instrumentation of the Attacker
The instrumentation emulates the buffering of stores in a TSO witness (Fig-
ure 4). Starting from stA, the stores are replaced by stores st
aux
A to auxiliary
addresses (a, d) that are only visible to the attacker. As long as a has not been
written, (a, d) holds the initial value 0. Once the attacker stores v into a, we
set mem[(a, d)] = (v, d). In this way, (a, d) always holds the most recent store.
A load r ← mem[a] of the attacker reads a value v from the buffer whenever
mem[(a, d)] = (v, d); otherwise mem[(a, d)] = 0 and the load obtains the value
v = mem[a] from memory. We turn to the translation.
Let tA declare registers r
∗, have initial location l0, and define instructions
〈linst〉∗ that contain stinst and ldinst from the attack. The instrumentation is
[[tA]] := thread t˜A regs r
∗ init l0
begin 〈linst〉∗ [[stinst]]A1 [[ldinst]]A1 [[〈linst〉]]
∗
A2 end.
It introduces a copy of the source code [[〈linst〉]]∗A2 where the stores are replaced
by accesses to auxiliary addresses. To move to the code copy, the attacker uses
an instrumented version [[stinst]]A1 of stinst.
[[l1: mem[e1] ← e2; goto l2;]]A1 := l1: mem[(e1, d)] ← (e2, d); goto l˜x; (1)
l˜x: mem[astA] ← e1; goto l˜2;
[[l1: r ← mem[e]; goto l2;]]A1 := l˜1: assert mem[(e, d)] = 0; goto l˜x1; (2)
l˜x1: mem[hb] ← true; goto l˜x2;
l˜x2: mem[(e, hb)] ← lda; goto l˜x3;
[[l1: mem[e1] ← e2; goto l2;]]A2 := l˜1: mem[(e1, d)] ← (e2, d); goto l˜2; (3)
[[l1: r ← mem[e]; goto l2;]]A2 := l˜1: assert mem[(e, d)] = 0; goto l˜x1; (4)
l˜x1: r ← mem[e]; goto l˜2;
l˜1: assert mem[(e, d)] 6= 0; goto l˜x2;
l˜x2: (r, d) ← mem[(e,d)]; goto l˜2;
[[l1: local; goto l2;]]A2 := l˜1: local; goto l˜2; (5)
[[l1: mfence; goto l2;]]A2 := (6)
Fig. 5: Instrumentation of the attacker.
The translation of instructions is defined in Figure 5. We make a few re-
marks. The instrumentation of stinst = l1: mem[e1] ← e2; goto l2; keeps the
address used in the store in a fresh address astA . For the sake of readability,
in Equation (4) we use memory accesses in instructions other than load and
store. Equation (6) deletes fences, as they forbid to delay stA over ldA. Let
ldinst = l1: r ← mem[e]; goto l2; be the load used in the attack. Equation (2)
checks that the load has not read its value early and sets an auxiliary happens-
before address (e, hb) to access level load, lda. We postpone the definition of
thread t˜1 regs r1 init l0 begin
/* Original code */
l0: mem[x] ← 1; goto l1;
l1: r1 ← mem[y]; goto l2;
/* Instrumented stinst */
l0: mem[(x, d)] ← (1, d); goto l˜x;
l˜x: mem[astA] ← x; goto l˜1;
/* Instrumented ldinst */
l˜1: assert mem[(y, d)] = 0; goto l˜x1;
l˜x1: mem[hb] ← true; goto l˜x2;
l˜x2: mem[(y, hb)] ← lda; goto l˜x3;
end
/* Instrumented copy of the store */
l˜0: mem[(x, d)] ← (1, d); goto l˜1;
/* Instrumented copy of the load */
l˜1: assert mem[(y, d)] = 0; goto l˜x4;
l˜x4: r ← mem[y]; goto l˜2;
l˜1: assert mem[(y, d)] 6= 0; goto l˜x5;
l˜x5: (r, d) ← mem[(y, d)]; goto l˜2;
Fig. 6: Attacker instrumentation of thread t1 in Dekker from Figure 2. The at-
tack’s store is the store at label l0, the load is the load at label l1.
access levels until the translation of helpers. It also sets hb flag for helpers to
indicate that they cannot execute actions not contributing to the happens-before
path. Figure 6 illustrates the instrumentation on our running example.
5.2 Instrumentation of Helpers
In TSO witnesses, by (W3), all helper actions after ldA are in happens-before
relation with ldA. To ensure this, we make use of Lemma 3. The proof from left
to right is by definition of happens before. For the reverse direction, note that
happens-before is stable under insertion. Consider st →src ld. A happens-before
relation remains valid in any computation that places actions between st and ld.
Lemma 3. Consider τ = τ1 · act1 · τ2 ∈ CSC(P) where for all act2 in τ2 we have
act1 →
∗
hb act2. Computation τ · act satisfies act1 →
∗
hb act iff
(i) there is an action act2 in act1 · τ2 with thread(act2) = thread(act) or
(ii) act is a load whose address is stored in act1 · τ2 or
(iii) act is a store (with issue) whose address is loaded or stored in act1 · τ2.
The lemma suggests the following instrumentation. For every helper t, we track
whether it has executed an action that depends on ldA. The idea is to use the
control flow. Upon detection of this first action, the thread moves to a copy of
its code. All actions from this copy stay in happens-before relation with ldA.
It remains to decide whether an action act allows a thread to move to the
code copy. According to Lemma 3, this depends on the earlier accesses to the
address a = addr (act). We introduce auxiliary happens-before addresses (a, hb)
that provide this access information. The addresses (a, hb) range over the domain
{0, lda, sta} of access types. It is sufficient to keep track of the maximal access
type wrt. the ordering 0 (no access) < lda (load access) < sta (store access).
[[l1: instr; goto l2;]]H0 := l1: assert mem[hb] = 0; goto lx; (7)
lx: instr; goto l2;
[[l1: r ← mem[e]; goto l2;]]H1 := l1: assert mem[(e, hb)] = sta; goto l˜x; (8)
l˜x: r ← mem[e]; goto l˜2;
[[l1: mem[e1]← e2; goto l2;]]H1 := l1: assert mem[(e, hb))] ≥ lda; goto l˜x1; (9)
l˜x1: mem[e1] ← e2; goto l˜x2;
l˜x2: mem[(e1, hb)]← sta; goto l˜2;
[[l1: local/mfence; goto l2;]]H2 := l˜1: local/mfence; goto l˜2; (10)
[[l1: mem[e1]← e2; goto l2;]]H2 := l˜1: mem[e1]← e2; goto l˜e; (11)
l˜e: mem[(e1, hb)]← sta; goto l˜2;
[[l1: r ← mem[e]; goto l2;]]H2 := l˜1: r˜ ← e; goto l˜x1; (12)
l˜x1: r ← mem[r˜]; goto l˜x2;
l˜x2: mem[(r˜, hb)] ← max{lda, mem[(r˜, hb)]}; goto l˜2;
[[l]]H3 := l˜: r˜ ← mem[astA]; goto l˜x1; (13)
l˜x1: r˜ ← mem[(r˜, hb)]; goto l˜x2;
l˜x2: assert r˜ 6= 0; goto l˜x3;
l˜x3: mem[suc] ← true; goto l˜x4;
Fig. 7: Instrumentation of helpers.
For the definition, consider a helper thread t that declares r∗, has initial label
l0, and defines instructions 〈linst〉
∗. The instrumented thread is
[[t]] := thread t˜ regs r˜, r∗ init l0
begin [[〈linst〉]]H0 ∗ [[〈ldstinst〉]]
∗
H1 [[〈linst〉]]
∗
H2 [[〈l〉]]
∗
H3 end.
Here, 〈ldstinst〉∗ is the subsequence of all load and store instructions. Their
instrumentation [[〈ldstinst〉]]∗H1 is used to move to the code copy [[〈linst〉]]
∗
H2.
Moreover, 〈l〉∗ are all labels used by the thread. The additional instructions
[[〈l〉]]∗H3 raise a success flag when a TSO witness has been found. [[〈linst〉]]H0 forces
helpers to either enter the code copy or stop when hb flag is raised.
The translation of instructions is given in Figure 7. We make some remarks.
Transitions to the code copy check the auxiliary addresses for whether the current
action is in happens-before relation with ldA. Loads in Equation (8) check for an
earlier store access to their address, Lemma 3(ii). Stores in Equation (9) require
that the address has seen at least a load, Lemma 3(iii). They set the access level
to sta. Loads and stores in the code copy maintain the auxiliary addresses to
contain the maximal access types, Equations (12) and (11). Note the auxiliary
register r˜ that ensures we do not overwrite the address. At every label of the code
copy we add a check, Equation (13), whether the address used in the attack’s
store has been accessed in the code copy. If so, a success flag is raised.
5.3 Soundness and Completeness
The flag indicates that the SC computation corresponds to a TSO witness, and
we call (pc, val) with val(suc) = true a goal configuration. The instrumentation
thus reduces feasibility of attack A to SC reachability of a goal configuration in
program PA. The instrumentation is sound and complete. If a goal configuration
is reachable, we can reconstruct a TSO witness for the attack. In turn, every
TSO witness ensures the goal configuration is reachable.
Theorem 2 (Soundness and Completeness). Attack A = (tA, stinst, ldinst)
is feasible in program P iff program PA reaches a goal configuration under SC.
In combination with Theorem 1, we can check robustness by inspecting all PA.
Theorem 3 (From Robustness to SC Reachability). Program P is robust
iff no instrumentation PA reaches a goal configuration under SC.
The instrumentation we provide is linear in size. Then, it follows from Theorem 3
that checking robustness for programs over finite data domains is in PSpace.
The problem is actually PSpace-complete due to the lower bound in [8].
6 Robustness for Parameterized Programs
We extend the study of robustness to parameterized programs. A parameterized
program represents an infinite family of instance programs that replicate the
threads multiple times. Syntactically, parameterized programs coincide with the
parallel programs we introduced in Section 2: they have a name and declare a
finite set of threads t1, . . . , tk. The difference is in the semantics. A parameterized
program represents a family of programs: for every vector I = (n1, . . . , nk) ∈ N
k,
a program instance P(I) declares ni copies of thread ti.
In the parameterized setting, the robustness problem asks whether all in-
stances of a given program are robust:
Given: A parameterized program P .
Problem: Does TrTSO(P(I)) = TrSC(P(I)) hold for all instances P(I) of P?
The problem is interesting because libraries usually cannot make assumptions on
the number of threads that use their functions. They have to guarantee proper
functioning for any number.
We reduce robustness for parameterized programs to a parameterized version
of reachability, based on the following insight. A parameterized program is not
robust if and only if there is an instance P(I) that is not robust. With Theorem 1,
instance P(I) is not robust if and only if there is an attack A that is feasible.
With the instrumentation from Section 5 and Theorem 3, this feasibility can be
checked as reachability of a goal configuration in P(I)A.
Algorithmically, it is impossible to instrument all (infinitely many) instance
programs. Instead, the idea is to instrument directly the parameterized program
P towards the attack A. Using the constructions from Section 5, we modify every
thread and again obtain program PA, which is now parameterized.
Actually, for the attacker we have to be slightly more careful. In an instance
program, only one copy of the thread should act as attacker, the remaining copies
have to behave like helpers. Therefore, the thread must be instrumented not only
as an attacker, but also as a helper. To ensure that only one copy of the attacker
delays stores, we add an additional flag variable. Before starting an attack, the
thread checks this variable. If it contains the initial value, the thread sets the
flag and starts delaying stores. If it has a different value, the thread continues to
run sequentially. This check requires an atomic test-and-set operation which can
be implemented on x86 by the lock cmpxchg instruction. Support for locked
instructions is immediate to add to our programming model.
Modulo these two changes, the instances PA(I) coincide with the instru-
mentations P(I)A. Together with the argumentation in last two paragraphs this
justifies the following theorem.
Theorem 4. A parameterized program P is not robust iff there is an attack A
so that an instance PA(I) of program PA reaches a goal configuration under SC.
Reachability of a goal configuration in one instance of PA can be reformulated
as a coverability problem for Petri nets, which is known to be decidable [26].
The key observation in the reduction to Petri nets is that threads in instance
programs never use their identifiers, simply because they are copies of the same
source code. This means there is no need to track the identity of threads, it
is sufficient to count how many instances of a thread are in each state — a
technique known as counter abstraction [13].
Theorem 5. Robustness for parameterized programs over finite data domains
is decidable and EXPSpace-hard — already for Boolean programs.
For the lower bound, we in turn encode the coverability problem for Petri nets
into robustness for parameterized programs [1,23]
7 Fence Insertion
To ease the presentation, we return to parallel programs. Since the algorithm
only relies on a robustness checker, it carries over to the parametric setting.
Our goal is to insert a set of fences that ensure robustness of the resulting
program. By inserting a fence at label l we mean the following modification of
the program. Introduce a fresh label lf . Then, translate each instruction l: inst;
goto l′; into lf: inst; goto l
′;. Finally, add an instruction l: mfence; goto lf;.
We call a set of labels F in program P a valid fence set if inserting fences
at these labels yields a robust program. We say that F is irreducible if no strict
subset is a valid fence set. In general, however, we would like to compute a valid
fence set which is optimal in some sense. We pose the fence computation problem:
Given: A program P and a strictly positive cost function C : LAB → R+.
Problem: Compute a valid fence set F with Σl∈FC(l) minimal.
Since we assume C to be strictly positive, every optimal fence set is irreducible.
We consider two criteria of optimality: minimization of program size and
maximization of program performance. By solving the problem for C ≡ 1 we
compute a fence set of minimal size, thus minimizing the code size of the fenced
program. Maximization of program performance requires minimizing the number
of times memory fence instructions are executed: practical measurements [1]
show that it is impossible to save CPU cycles by executing more fences, but
with less stores in the TSO buffer. For this, C(l) is defined as the frequency
at which instructions labeled by l occur in executions of the original program
P . Concrete values of C can be either estimated by profiling or computed by
mathematical reasoning about the program.
From a complexity point of view, fence computation is at least as hard as
robustness. Indeed, robustness holds if and only if the optimal valid fence set is
F = ∅. Actually, since fence sets can be enumerated, computing an optimal valid
fence set does not require more space than checking robustness. Notice that this
also holds in the parameterized case.
Theorem 6. For programs over finite domains, fence computation is PSpace-
complete. In the parameterized case, it is decidable and EXPSpace-hard.
In the remainder of the section, we give a practical algorithm for computing
optimal valid fence sets.
7.1 Fence Sets for Attacks
We say that a label l is involved in the attack A = (tA, stinst, ldinst) if it belongs
to some path in the control flow graph of tA from the destination label of stinst
to the source label of ldinst. We denote the set of all such labels by LA.
We call a set of labels FA an eliminating fence set for attack A if adding fences
at all labels in FA eliminates the attack. Dekker’s algorithm has two eliminating
fence sets: FA = {l1} eliminates the only attack by t1, and FA′ = {l
′
1} eliminates
the only attack by t2. Actually, the sets are irreducible: no strict subset eliminates
the attack. Note that any irreducible eliminating set FA satisfies FA ⊆ LA.
Lemma 4. Every irreducible valid fence set F can be represented as a union of
irreducible eliminating fence sets for all feasible attacks.
Proof. By Theorem 1, fence set F eliminates all feasible attacks. Therefore, it
includes some irreducible eliminating fence set FA for every feasible attack A.
By irreducibility, F cannot contain labels outside the union of these FA sets. ⊓⊔
In compliance with the lemma, in the Dekker’s program F = FA ∪ FA′ .
Lemma 4 is useful for fence computation since optimal fence sets are always
irreducible. All irreducible eliminating fence sets for attacks can be constructed
by an exhaustive search through all selections of labels involved in the attack.
For each candidate fence set, to judge whether it eliminates the attack, we check
SC reachability in the instrumented program as described in Section 5.
Note that this search may raise an exponential number of reachability queries.
In practice this rarely constitutes a problem. First, attacks seldom have a large
number of involved labels, so the number of candidates is small. Second, the
reachability checks can be avoided if a candidate fence set covers all the ways in
the control flow graph from stinst to ldinst.
7.2 Computing an Optimal Valid Fence Set
To choose among the sets FA, we set up a 0/1-integer linear programming (ILP)
problem MP · xP ≥ bP . The optimal solutions f(xP ) → min correspond to
optimal fence sets. Here, 0/1 means the variables are restricted to yield Booleans.
We define inequalities that encode the feasible attacks with their corrections.
Consider attack A for which we have determined the irreducible eliminating
fence sets F1, . . . ,Fn. For each set, we introduce a variable xFi and set up
Inequality (14)(left). It selects a fence set to eliminate the attack.
∑
1≤i≤n
xFi ≥ 1
∑
l∈Fi
xl≥ |Fi|xFi f(xP ) :=
∑
l∈LAB
C(l)xl. (14)
When Fi has been chosen, we insert a fence at each of its labels l. We add further
variables xl, and encode this insertion by Inequality (14)(center). By definition
of the ILP, the variables xFi and xl will only take Boolean values 0 or 1. So if
xFi is set to 1, the inequality requires that all xl with l ∈ Fi are set to 1.
Our goal is to select fences with minimal costs. We encode this into the
objective function (14)(right). An optimal solution x∗ of the resulting 0/1-ILP
denotes the fence set F(x∗) := {l ∈ LAB | x∗l = 1}.
Theorem 7. F(x∗) is valid and optimal, and thus solves fence computation.
8 Experimental Evaluation
We implemented our algorithms in a prototype called Trencher [1]. The tool
performs the reduction of robustness to SC reachability given in Section 5 and
computes a minimal fence set as described in Section 7. Trencher executes
independent reachability queries in parallel and uses Spin [16] as back-end model
checker. With Trencher, we have performed a series of experiments.
8.1 Examples
The first class of examples are mutual exclusion protocols that are implemented
via shared variables. These protocols are typically not robust under TSO and
require additional fences after stores to synchronization variables. We studied
robust and non-robust instances of Dekker and Peterson for two threads, as well
as Lamport’s fast mutex [22] for three threads. Moreover, we checked the CLH
and MCS Locks, robust list-based queue locks that use compare-and-set [15].
As second class of examples, we considered concurrent data structures.
The Lock-Free Stack is a concurrent stack implementation using compare-and-
swap [15]. Cilk’s THE WSQ is a work stealing queue from the implementation
of the Cilk-5 programming language [12].
Finally, we consider miscellaneous concurrent algorithms that are known to
be sensitive to program order relaxations. We analyse several instances of the
Non-Blocking Write protocol [17]. NBWL is the spinlock + non-blocking write
example considered by Owens in Section 8 of [24]. Finally, our tool discovers the
known bug in Java’s Parker implementation that is due to TSO relaxations [11].
The test inputs are available online [1].
Program T L I RQ NR1 NR2 R F Spin Ver Real
Peterson (non-robust) 2 14 18 23 2 12 9 2 7.7 0.5 2.9
Peterson (robust) 2 16 20 12 12 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Dekker (non-robust) 2 24 30 95 12 28 55 4 31.7 2.1 14.2
Dekker (robust) 2 32 38 30 30 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Lamport (non-robust) 3 33 36 36 9 15 12 6 14.4 6.0 5.9
Lamport (robust) 3 39 42 27 27 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CLH Lock (robust) 7 62 58 54 48 6 0 0 4.9 0.2 1.6
MCS Lock (robust) 4 52 50 30 26 4 0 0 2.9 0.4 0.9
Lock-Free Stack (robust) 4 46 50 14 14 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cilk’s THE WSQ (non-robust) 5 86 79 152 141 8 3 3 10.0 18.0 7.4
NBW2 (non-robust) 2 21 19 15 9 5 1 1 2.5 0.2 0.8
NBW3 (robust) 2 22 20 15 15 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
NBW4 (robust) 3 25 22 9 7 2 0 0 0.7 0.1 0.4
NBWL (robust) 4 45 45 30 26 4 0 0 2.7 0.2 0.7
Parker (non-robust) 2 9 8 2 0 1 1 1 0.5 0.0 0.3
Parker (robust) 2 10 9 2 2 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Table 2: Benchmarking results.
8.2 Benchmarking
We executed Trencher on the examples, using a machine with Intel(R)
Core(TM) i5 CPU M 560 @ 2.67GHz (4 cores) running GNU/Linux. Table 2
summarizes the results. The columns T, L, and I give the number of threads,
labels, and instructions in the example. RQ is the number of reachability queries
raised by Trencher. Provided the example is robust, this number is equal to
the number of attacks (tA, stinst, ldinst). NR1 is the number of verification queries
that were answered negatively by Trencher itself, without running Spin. Such
queries correspond to attacks where stinst cannot be delayed past ldinst because
of memory fences or locked instructions in between. NR2 and R are the numbers
of queries that are answered negatively/positively by the external model checker.
Hence, RQ = NR1 + NR2 + R. F is the number of fences inserted.
The column Spin gives the total CPU time taken by Spin and Clang, the C
compiler, to produce a verifier executable (pan). The column Ver provides the
total CPU time taken by Trencher and the external verifier. Real is the wall-
clock time in seconds of processing an example. All times are given in seconds.
8.3 Discussion
The analysis of robust algorithms is particularly fast. They typically only have
a small number of attacks that have to be checked by a model checker. Robust
Dekker and Peterson do not have such attacks at all. In the CLH and MCS locks,
their number is less than 20%.
In some examples (non-robust Dekker, CLH Lock, NBW2, NBW4), up to
94% of the CPU time was spent on generating verifiers. This leaves room for
improvement by switching to a model checker without compilation phase. For
some examples (LamNR, CLHLock), the wall-clock time constitutes 1/3 to 1/4
of the CPU time (4-cores). This confirms good parallelizability of the approach.
Remarkably, our trace-based analysis can establish robustness of the NBWL
example, as opposed to the earlier analyses via triangular data races which would
have to place a fence [24].
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A Definition of Traces
Since the definition of traces in Section 3 was a bit brief, we recall here the full
construction. Consider an SC or a TSO computation α ∈ CSC(P) ∪ CTSO(P).
Its trace Tr(α) is a node-labelled graph (N, λ,→po,→st,→src) with nodes N ,
labelling λ : N → ACT, and→po,→st,→src ⊆ N×N the aforementioned relations
that define the edges. The program order is a union of→po = ∪t∈THRD →
t
po of per
thread total orders. The store ordering →st = ∪a∈DOM →
a
st gives a total order for
the stores to each address. We use the syntax max (→tpo) and max (→
a
st) to access
the maximal elements in these total orders. Finally, we have a source relation
→src from stores to loads.
Traces are defined inductively, starting from the empty trace for the empty
word ε. Assume we already constructed Tr(α) = (N, λ,→po,→st,→src). In the
definition of Tr(α · act) := (N ∪ {n}, λ′,→′po,→
′
st,→
′
src), the choice of n depends
on the type of act. If we have a store, we use the moment the action was issued.
Otherwise, we add a new node:
act = (t, st, a, v) Let n be the minimal node in →tpo labelled by λ(n) = isu. We
set λ′ := λ[n := act] and →′po := →po.
act 6= (t, st, a, v) We add a fresh node n /∈ N to the trace, set λ′ := λ∪{(n, act)},
and →′po := →po ∪ {(max (→
t
po), n)}.
The store order is updated only for stores (t, st, a, v). We define →′st := →st
∪ {(max(→ast), n)}. The relation is not changed otherwise. The source relation
is updated only for loads and stores. In case of a load (t, ld, a, v) we set →′src
:= →src ∪ {(max(→
a
st), n)}. In case of a store (t, st, a, v) we update the source
relation for loads that read from the store early: for all nodes m with n →+po m
and λ(m) = (t, ld, a, v) we set →′src := (→src \ {(∗,m)}) ∪ {(n,m)}.
Consider trace Tr(α) with α ∈ CTSO(P). The conflict relation →cf from load to
store actions makes cyclic accesses in the trace visible. We define ld →cf st if
there is another store action st′ in Tr(τ) that satisfies st′ →src ld and st
′ →st st.
If ld reads the initial value of an address and st overwrites it, we also have
ld →cf st. The happens-before relation of a trace is a union of all four relations:
→hb := →po ∪ →st ∪ →src ∪ →cf .
B Minimal Violations and Locality
in our earlier work [8] we showed that in a minimal violation only one thread
reorders its actions. Since we employ here a more elaborate programming model,
this locality result has to be checked again.
Consider a computation τ = α · a · β · b · γ ∈ CTSO(P) with two actions a and
b of the same thread thread(a) = t = thread(b). We define the distance dτ (a, b)
between a and b in τ as the number of actions in β that also belong to this
thread: dτ (a, b) := ||β ↓ t||len . The number of delays #(τ) in computation τ is the
sum of distances between corresponding issue and store actions:
#(τ) :=
∑
corr. isu,st in τ
dτ (isu, st).
We call a violating computation τ a minimal violation if it is has a minimal
number of delays among all violating computations. Clearly, a program P has
violating computations if and only if it has a minimal violation.
The following lemma says that if a store action has been delayed, then it has
been delayed past a load action of the same thread. Moreover, the load did not
read the value of this store action early.
Lemma 5. Consider a minimal violation τ = α · isu ·β · st · γ ∈ CTSO(P), where
isu and st stem from the same instruction instance of thread t. Then β ↓ t is either
empty, or β ↓ t = β′ · ld · β′′ where ld is a load action with addr (ld) 6= addr (st)
and β′′ contains only store actions.
Proof. Suppose β contains one or more actions of thread t. If all actions of thread
t in β are stores, then also τ ′ = α · β · isu · st · γ is a TSO computation of P . It
has the same trace as τ but #(τ ′) < #(τ), which contradicts minimality of τ .
Otherwise let a be the last non-store action in β ↓ t, i.e., β = β1 · a · β2 and
all actions in β2 are stores or belong to threads different from t. Since store
actions cannot be delayed past a memory fence of the same thread, a is an issue
action, a local action, or a load. In the former two cases, as well as if a is a load
from addr (ld) = addr (st), delaying st past a can be avoided in the computation
τ ′ = α · isu · β1 · β2 · st · a · γ of P . It has the same trace as τ and #(τ
′) < #(τ),
which contradicts minimality of τ . ⊓⊔
In the remainder of the section, we develop a method to detect happens-before
relations in a trace with the help of embedded computations. We relate two
actions in a computation iff the corresponding nodes in the trace are related. To
avoid case distinctions for issue and store actions that yield the same node in
the trace, we introduce the issue relation →isu that links them: isu →isu st. We
include →isu into →hb.
Definition 2 ([8]). Let τ = α ·a ·β ·b ·γ ∈ CTSO(P). We say a happens-before b
through β if there is a (potentially empty) subsequence c1 . . . cn of β that satisfies
(assuming c0 := a and cn+1 := b):
ai →hb ai+1 or ai →
+
po ai+1 for all i ∈ [0, n].
The next lemma states that the just defined relation is stable under insertion.
Lemma 6 ([8]). Consider computations τ = α ·a ·β ·b ·γ and τ ′ = α′ ·a ·β′ ·b ·γ′
in CTSO(P) so that τ ↓ t = τ
′ ↓ t for every thread t. Let β be a subsequence of β′.
Then if a→+hb b through β then a→
+
hb b through β
′.
The following lemma says that if two actions in a minimal violation are not
related via→+hb, they can be reordered without changing the trace and the order
of actions within each thread.
Lemma 7 ([8]). Consider a minimal violation τ = α · a · β · b · γ ∈ CTSO(P).
Then (1) a →+hb b through β or (2) there is τ
′ = α · β1 · b · a · β2 · γ ∈ CTSO(P)
so that Tr(τ) = Tr(τ ′) and τ ↓ t = τ ′ ↓ t for every thread t.
Proof. We establish ¬(1) ⇒ (2). Note that this proves the disjunction since
¬(2)⇒ (1) is the contrapositive. We proceed by induction on ||β||len and slightly
strengthen the hypothesis: we also show that β2 is a subsequence of β.
Base case: ||β||len = 0. Then τ = α ·a ·b ·γ and a 6→hb b. If thread(a) = thread(b),
then b →+po a. Therefore, b is a store action which has been delayed past a.
Swapping a and b will save the delay without changing the trace, in contradiction
to the minimality of τ .
If thread(a) 6= thread(b), then either at least one of the two actions is local,
the actions access different addresses, or both are loads. In all cases swapping
them produces τ ′ as required in the statement of the lemma.
Step case: Assume the statement holds for ||β||len ≤ n. Consider τ
′ = α·a·β ·b·γ
with ||β||len = n+1. Let c be the last action in β = β
′ · c. Since a 6→+hb b through
β, then a 6→+hb c through β
′ or c 6→hb b.
Let a 6→+hb c. We apply the induction hypothesis to τ with respect to a and c.
This gives τ ′ = α ·β′1 · c ·a ·β
′
2 · b ·γ with the same trace and thread computations
as τ . Then, taking into account Lemma 6, we apply the hypothesis to τ ′ with
respect to a and b. This yields τ ′′ = α · β′1 · c · β
′
21 · b · a · β
′
22 · γ having the same
trace and thread computations as τ ′ and τ . Note that β′22 is a subsequence of
β′2, which in turn is a subsequence of β
′ and hence of β.
Let c 6→hb b. We apply the induction hypothesis to τ with respect to b and c,
getting τ ′ = α · a · β′ · b · c · γ with the same trace and thread computations as τ .
Applying it again to τ ′ with respect to a and b gives τ ′′ = α · β′1 · b · a · β
′
2 · c · γ.
The computation has the same trace and thread computations as τ ′ and τ . Since
β′2 is a subsequence of β
′, β′2 · c is a subsequence of β. ⊓⊔
Lemma 8 (Locality [8]). In a minimal violation, only a single thread delays
stores.
Proof. Consider a minimal violation τ ∈ CTSO(P) and suppose at least two
threads delayed stores. By Lemma 5, each store was delayed past a load of the
same thread. Let st2 of thread t2 be the overall last delayed store in τ , and let
ld2 be the last load of t2 overstepped by st2. Similarly, let st1 be the overall last
delayed store in a thread t1 6= t2. Let ld1 be the last load overstepped by st1.
The following fundamental mutual dispositions of reorderings are possible:
1. τ = γ1 · isu1 · γ2 · ld1 · γ3 · st1 · γ4 · isu2 · γ5 · ld2 · γ6 · st2 · γ7
2. τ = γ1 · isu1 · γ2 · ld1 · γ3 · isu2 · γ4 · ld2 · γ5 · st2 · γ6 · st1 · γ7
3. τ = γ1 · isu1 · γ2 · ld1 · γ3 · isu2 · γ4 · ld2 · γ5 · st1 · γ6 · st2 · γ7
In these three computations every pair (ldi, sti) provides a happens-before cycle:
sti →
+
po ldi and, by Lemma 7 and minimality, ldi →
+
hb sti through the appropriate
subrange of τ .
In the first disposition τ is not minimal, since it can be shortened to the
violating computation τ ′ = γ1 · isu1 · γ2 · ld1 · γ3 · st1 · β with #(τ
′) < #(τ). Here,
β contains only store actions of t2 that complete earlier issue actions.
In the second disposition τ is not minimal either. Starting from ld1, thread
t1 does not perform any actions, except delayed stores, until st1 (Lemma 5).
Therefore, ld1 and all program order later actions of t1 can be safely removed
from τ without affecting the happens-before cycle produced by t2. The resulting
computation has a smaller number of delays (due to the removed ld1), but its
trace still includes the cycle by t2. A contradiction to minimality of τ .
Lastly, in the third case τ is also not minimal. First we delete γ7. Then we
erase all actions from γ6 that do not belong to t2: γ
′
6 = γ6 ↓ t2. By construction,
the resulting computation τ ′ is a feasible TSO computation:
τ ′ = γ1 · isu1 · γ2 · ld1 · γ3 · isu2 · γ4 · ld2 · γ5 · st1 · γ
′
6 · st2.
Computation τ ′ still contains the happens-before cycle st1 →
+
po ld1 →
+
hb st1
inherited from τ . Since deleting actions cannot increase the number of delays,
#(τ ′) = #(τ). Moreover, since τ is a minimal violation, so is τ ′.
By Lemma 7, ld2 →
+
hb st2 through γ5 · st1 · γ
′
6. By the choice of ld1 and st1
and in accordance with Lemma 5, (γ3 · isu2 ·γ4 · ld2 ·γ5)↓ t1 only contains delayed
stores that were issued before ld1. By definition, γ
′
6 does not contain actions of
t1 at all. Therefore, ld1 is the program order last action of t1. It can be safely
removed from τ ′ without affecting the cycle of t2. The resulting computation is
τ ′′ = γ1 · isu1 · γ2 · γ3 · isu2 · γ4 · ld2 · γ5 · st1 · γ
′
6 · st2.
Note that #(τ ′′) < #(τ ′) = #(τ), but computation τ ′′ still contains the cycle
st2 →
+
po ld2 →
+
hb st2. A contradiction to minimality of τ . ⊓⊔
C Soundness and Completeness of the Instrumentation
Theorem 8 (Soundness and Completeness). Attack A = (tA, stinst, ldinst)
is feasible in program P iff program PA reaches a goal configuration under SC.
Proof. Soundness. Suppose the instrumented program reaches a goal config-
uration. For simplicity, assume that it immediately stops after this. Then the
computation of the instrumented program looks like this:
τA = τ1 · isustA · st
aux
A · τ2 · ldA · τ3 · isusuc · stsuc.
The last action, stsuc, is performed by a helper and sets variable suc to true,
as required by the definition of goal configurations. This action originates from
an instruction generated in accordance with (13). To reach this instruction, the
helper has to enter its code copy.
As required by (8) and (9), for the first helper to enter its code copy, the
attacker must set a hb-variable to a non-zero value by executing ldinst (action
ldA) instrumented in accordance with (2). For this, the attacker must enter its
code copy and start performing stores to auxiliary addresses. Accordingly, the
first attacker’s store to an auxiliary address is denoted by stauxA in τ . It stems
from the instrumented stinst (1) and is located before ldA.
We elaborate on the contents of τ1, τ2, and τ3. First, the attacker and helpers
execute the code of the original program (helpers — with an additional check
at every instruction, (7)). In τ2 the helpers continue to execute the code of the
original program. Shortly before performing ldA and stopping, the attacker sets
variable hb to true thus forcing the helpers to enter their code copies. Therefore
all actions in τ3 belong to helpers that have entered their code copies. Also,
τ2 only contains stores of the attacker to auxiliary addresses, and τ3 does not
contain attacker action at all, as follows from (2).
We now turn τA into the following TSO witness computation:
τ = τ ′1 · isustA · τ
′
2 · ldA · τ
′
3 · stA · τ
′
4.
Here, τ ′1 is the subsequence of all τ1 actions that are produced by instructions
from P (this is τ1 without the conditionals introduced in (7)). Computation τ
′
2
is the subsequence of all actions of τ2 produced by instructions from P and by
their clones in the code copy of the attacker, except the store actions to auxiliary
address. These store actions constitute τ ′4. Finally, τ
′
3 is the subsequence of all
helper actions of τ3 produced by clones of instructions from P . We also strip the
suffix d from the addresses of load and store actions in τ ′2 and τ
′
4.
That τ is a computation of program P follows from the fact that τA is exe-
cutable. We just removed actions produced by the instrumentation and replaced
buffering by delaying of store actions; we did not change any data dependencies.
The delaying of stA · τ
′
4 past ldA is possible because the attacker did not execute
memory fences between stauxA and ldA, as guaranteed by (6).
Let us check that τ is a TSO witness (Figure 4). (W1) holds as in τ indeed
only the attacker delays stores. The first delayed store stA is an instance of
stinst, load ldA is an instance of ldinst and is the last action of the attacker that
is overstepped by delayed stores, (W2) holds. For each act in ldA · τ3 · stA it
holds ldA →
∗
hb act, (W3). This is by construction of helpers in accordance with
Lemma 3. Computation τ ′4 consists only of the stores delayed by the attacker,
(W4). (W5) holds due to the check in (2). So, τ is a TSO witness for attack A.
Completeness. Suppose there is a TSO witness τ for attack A as in Figure 4:
τ = τ1 · isustA · τ2 · ldA · τ3 · stA · τ4.
We show that the instrumented program has an execution that leads to a goal
state. In the beginning, the instrumented attacker and helper threads execute
instructions of the original program, namely those in τ1. The helpers actually
execute these actions instrumented by (7), i.e., with an additional assert. These
conditionals are executable because the attacker did not yet set variable hb.
Then the attacker executes [[stinst]]A1 (stinst is the instruction that produced
isustA in τ) and enters the code copy. Now all its stores will be executed on
auxiliary addresses, as defined in (1) and (3). This means, they stay invisible
to the helper threads as they were in the computation of the original program.
Also, the instrumentation of loads (4) makes sure that they read buffered values,
if they exist. Altogether this preserves the data dependencies from the original
computation.
So the attacker executes the instructions that lie in τ2, instrumented by
[[−]]A2. Note that τ2 does not contain memory fences, otherwise stA could not have
been delayed past ldA in τ . Therefore, (6) cannot provoke a block of the attacker.
The helpers still execute the actions of the original program, instrumented by
(7). Finally, the attacker executes ldinst which produced ldA in τ , Equation (2).
This is possible due to (W5).
All actions in τ3 belong to helpers. By (W3), they are in happens-before
relation with ldA. Therefore, due to the instrumentation based on Lemma 3,
the helpers are able to enter their code copies, (8) and (9), and execute the
instructions that produced τ3. Note that the instrumentation of the code copy
for helpers does not introduce any conditionals that could block the execution.
At least one of the helper’s actions in τ3 performs a load or a store to the
address used in stA. Otherwise, (W3) would not hold (ldA and the delayed write
of the attacker use different addresses by (W5)). When performing the action
in the instrumented program, the helper will set the hb-variable for the address
used in stA to a non-zero value, Equations (11) and (12). Therefore, at the next
step the helper will be able to set suc to true in accordance with (13) and make
the instrumented program reach a goal state. ⊓⊔
D Decidability and Complexity
The reductions of robustness to reachability and parameterized reachability are
independent of the number of addresses and the structure of the data domain.
Hence, without further assumptions the resulting reachability queries cannot
be guaranteed to be decidable. We now discuss conditions on address space and
data domain that render robustness decidable. Note that we only have to restrict
these two dimensions. The instrumentation copes with the unbounded size store
buffers. Moreover, we choose the verification technology so that it handles the
unbounded number of threads required in parameterized reachability.
Parallel Programs with Finite Domains Consider a parallel program over
a finite data domain, and hence finite address space. In this setting robustness is
PSpace-complete [8]. Our earlier proof is of complexity-theoretic nature: based
on enumeration and not meant to be implemented. The instrumentation in this
paper yields an alternative proof of membership in PSpace that is conceptually
simpler and allows us to reuse all techniques that have been developed for finite
state verification.
Theorem 9. Robustness for parallel programs over finite domains is PSpace-
complete.
Parameterized Programs with Finite Domains Consider parameterized
programs over finite domains. In this setting, decidability of robustness was
open (our techniques from [8] do not carry over). With Theorem 4, we can now
solve the problem and establish decidability. The key observation is that threads
in instance programs never use their identifiers, simply because they are copies
of the same source code. This means there is no need to track the identity of
threads, it is sufficient to count how many instances of a thread are in each
state — a technique known as counter abstraction [13]. Using this technique,
we can reformulate the reachability problem for parameterized programs as a
coverability problem for Petri nets. We briefly recall the basics on Petri nets.
Definitions A Petri net is a tripleN = (S, T,W ) where S is a finite set of places,
T is a finite set of transitions with S ∩ T = ∅, and W : (S × T ) ∪ (T × S) → N
is a weight function. A marking is a function that assigns a natural number
to each place: M : S → N. A marked Petri net is a pair (N,M0) of a Petri
net and an initial marking M0. A transition t ∈ T is enabled in marking M if
M(s) ≥ W (s, t) for all s ∈ S. The firing relation [〉 ⊆ N|S| × T × N|S| contains
a tuple (M1, t,M2) if transition t is enabled in M1 and for all s ∈ S we have
M2(s) = M1(s)−W (s, t)+W (t, s). We also write M1[t〉M2. We extend the firing
relation to sequences of transitions.
We say that a marking M is reachable in a marked Petri net (N,M0) if there
is a transition sequence σ ∈ T ∗, such that M0[σ〉M . A marking M is coverable
if there is a reachable marking M ′ so that M(s)′ ≥M(s) for all s ∈ S.
Lemma 9 ([26]). The problem to determine whether a marking M is coverable
in a marked Petri net (N,M0) is decidable.
Reduction of parameterized reachability to Petri net coverability Let
P be a parameterized program with finite data domain DOM. We define a Petri
net N = (S, T,W ) simulating the program.
For each pair of address and value (a, v) ∈ DOM×DOM we create a place sa,v.
These places represent the state of the global memory: M(sa,v) = 1 corresponds
to val(a) = v.
For each thread ti that declares registers ri and has labels li we create places
sl,v for all l ∈ li and all v ∈ DOM
|ri|. These places encode the number of thread
instances in the given control state that have the given register valuation.
For each thread ti we create a transition ti. Let l0,i be the initial label of ti,
ri be the registers declared by ti, and v0,i be a zero vector of length |ri|. Then
we set W (ti, sl0,i,v0,i) = 1. Transition ti effectively spawns an arbitrary number
of copies of thread ti that are all in the initial state.
Next we create transitions that simulate the instructions in each thread.
We explain the construction for load instructions. The other instructions are
handled along similar lines. Consider thread ti with registers ri and a labelled
load instruction linst = l1: r ← mem[fa(ra)]; goto l2; . For each value v ∈ DOM
and for each vector vreg ∈ DOM
|ri| we create a transition t = tlinst ,v,vreg . We set
W (sl1,vreg , t) = W (t, sl2,vreg ′) = 1 where vreg
′ = vreg [r := v]. Let a = fa(vreg ↓ra).
Then we set W (sa,v, t) = W (t, sa,v) = 1. Transition t is enabled if there is an
instance of the thread in control state is l1 so that its register valuation is vreg
and address a being read holds value v. Firing the transition only updates the
state of the thread instance: its program counter is set to label l2, and the value
of register r is set to v.
We define the initial marking byM0(sa,0) = 1 for all a ∈ DOM, andM0(s) = 0
for all other places s ∈ S. Reaching a goal configuration val(suc) = true in the
parameterized program now corresponds to covering the following marking Msuc
in the resulting Petri net: Msuc(ssuc,true) = 1 and Msuc(s) = 0 for all other places
s ∈ S. Combining this reduction with Lemma 9 gives Theorem 10.
Theorem 10. Robustness for parameterized programs over finite domains is
decidable.
Lower bound The upper bound on robustness for parameterized programs
depends on the data domain. Interestingly, an EXPSpace lower bound already
holds for domains with two values. The proof reduces the coverability problem
in Petri nets to robustness of parameterized programs. EXPSpace-hardness of
coverability is a classic result by Lipton [23]. That we can restrict ourselves to
domains with two elements means the control flow in a parameterized program
is expressive enough to encode the Petri net behaviour.
The idea behind the construction is to take thread instances as tokens. Each
thread has a label for each place in the Petri net, plus an additional label that
indicates the token is currently not in use. The Petri net transitions are mimicked
by a controller thread. It serialises the reading and writing of tokens, checks the
coverability query, and then enters a non-robust situation. To read and write
tokens, the controller communicates with the token threads via the memory.
The construction requires locked instructions, which are immediate to add to
our programming model.
Theorem 11. Robustness for parameterized programs is EXPSpace-hard, for
any domain with at least two elements.
